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To test the proposition that metropolitan governmental structure has social, economic, and racial
consequences, the authors assume that the proliferation of local governments in a metropolitan
area and the boundary constraints imposed on the central city have adverse effects, especially on
the core city. Analyzing 97 large U.S. metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs), they found only
limited support for this proposition. Of three measures of fragmentation, only two were of any
consequence, one in the opposite direction predicted. The lower the central city’s share of MSA
population, the higher the level of fiscal health for the inner city. Also, municipal boundaries
have racial consequences.
Urban America continues its sprawling ways. For more than a half century,
the country has pursued one dominant vision of urban growth—unlimited
low-density sprawl (Downs 1994, 3). And with considerable success. But
such a model of urban development leaves a multitude of problems in its
wake, especially the growing inequality between the central city and its sub-
urbs. Some critics think this separation of resources from needs and the seg-
regation of America’s people by race and income threaten the country’s long-
term well-being. Other authorities, although not endorsing separation and
segregation, think these disparities are largely the product of market forces.
Some observers blame government, citing various ways in which public pol-
icy has contributed to central-city/suburban differences. In fact, certain
scholars (Hill 1974; Rusk 1995) have blamed the politically fragmented
metropolis for many of the country’s urban ills. Yet the question remains
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unsettled. To what extent does the polycentric metropolis contribute to the
gap between city and suburb—the separation of resources from needs and the
growing divisions by race and income?
This research will offer a test of the basic proposition that metropolitan
fragmentation contributes to central-city/suburban inequality. This research
will include three dependent variables—income inequality, racial segrega-
tion, and a measure of municipal fiscal health—for a large group of the
nation’s largest metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs). We test the effects of
three measures of fragmentation: (1) the number of cities within the metropo-
lis, (2) the percentage of MSA land area within the central city, and (3) a
measure of central-city annexation.
THE POLYCENTRIC METROPOLIS
AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
Three major developments characterize metropolitan America. The popu-
lation continues to spread to outlying areas; indeed, most growth occurs in
those suburbs most distant from the core. As urban areas deconcentrate, the
proliferation of local jurisdictions increases (see Burns 1994). These separate
jurisdictions perpetuate if not intensify the racial, ethnic, and class differ-
ences that have long been the bane of the large U.S. metropolis. The spread-
ing of urban America also may increase the inequality among political enti-
ties, further widening the gap between central-city needs and suburban
resources. The extent to which the existence of multiple units of govern-
ment—metropolitan fragmentation—significantly contributes to the prob-
lems of the inner-city remains in dispute, however.
How important are political boundaries? Some years ago, Haar (1972, 1)
declared that “perhaps the most intractable cause of political strife and mis-
government is the division of the earth into political jurisdictions.” Eastern
Europe today exemplifies the accuracy of this assertion. In the United States,
critics often have lamented the lack of “fit” between the problems of large
urban areas and the jurisdictional boundaries that fragment the political
authority of the American metropolis. Two fundamental problems are proba-
bly the most serious—the separation of needs and resources and the per-
petuation of class and racial inequality. Many observers contend that frag-
mentation is not random, accidental, or merely the product of neutral market
forces (Danielson 1976; Logan and Schneider 1982; Newton 1975). As
Downs (1973, 1) noted, urban development in America is not chaotic or
unplanned; quite the opposite. It leads to precisely the results desired by those
who dominate the process. Certain groups can segregate themselves from
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less desirable others through the creation of myriad separate localities. Much
of the outward movement and the subsequent creation of separate enclaves
results from class and racial antipathy and/or the desire to protect the middle-
class tax base (Miller 1981).
Weiher (1991) offered an information-based theoretical model to explain
the importance of political borders. The key elements are perceptions, prefer-
ences, and the jurisdictional boundaries themselves. The presence of multi-
ple local governments within a metropolitan region provides a simple, low-
cost cognitive framework to those persons engaged in a search for residential
housing. Potential movers can quickly learn about community differ-
ences—the quality of schools, the affordability of housing, the presence of
crime and drugs, and the racial and class composition of the various enclaves.
Thus political borders represent powerful cues to persons making locational
decisions. They “provide decision-makers with a frame of reference for
structuring information about the characteristics of potential neighbors resid-
ing within those boundaries” (Weiher 1991, 84). In short, according to Wei-
her, the presence of multiple jurisdictions in itself is a causal influence on
population sorting and separation by race and class.
A major assumption of this thesis is that most white urban dwellers con-
tinue to be averse to contact with blacks, especially in residential neighbor-
hoods (Massey and Mullan 1984; Schuman and Bobo 1988). Massey and
Hajnal (1995, 539) emphasized how the nation’s segregation patterns over
this century have “consistently evolved to satisfy one overriding princi-
ple—the minimization of white-black contact.” They also noted a change in
the level at which segregation occurs. The most recent manifestation of racial
separation is at the municipal rather than the neighborhood level. Weiher’s
(1991, 113) research on Cook County, Illinois, and Los Angeles County con-
firmed that, over time, racial segregation has become organized by city rather
than by neighborhood. Miller’s (1981) study of Los Angeles County substan-
tiated this pattern. Over a long period, separate incorporation became a
device to segregate by race and income and to protect the tax base of middle-
class communities (also see Burns 1994, 81-95).
Although the polycentric metropolis generates other allegedly adverse
consequences,1 we will deal with only three: (1) the income gap between cen-
tral city and suburb, (2) the fiscal burden imposed on central cities by the
decentralization of jobs and people, and (3) the separation of urban dwellers
by race. Over decades, abundant research documents the socioeconomic dis-
parities between the core and its periphery (Downs 1973, 13-16; Eklund and
Williams 1978; Nathan and Adams 1989; Schnore 1963). Early on, most
researchers were careful to distinguish these differences by region and city
size. The stereotype of the impoverished black inner city surrounded by
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affluent white suburbs applies consistently only to large MSAs and those in
the Northeast (Campbell and Sacks 1967, 20-24; also see Hill and Wolman
1997). Existing disparities are growing, however. Logan and Schneider
(1982) reported that income inequalities rose sharply in most metropolitan
regions between 1960 and 1970. Census data for 1990 continue to reveal
large income gaps between the central city and perimeter cities, especially in
the Northeast and Midwest (Frey 1993, 3-36).
In addition to income and racial disparities, some studies suggested that a
multinucleated structure has adverse fiscal consequences for the core city.
The findings here are less conclusive. The common complaint is that the frac-
tured metropolis creates an “institutional arrangement for promoting and
protecting the unequal distribution of scarce resources” (Hill 1974, 1559).
For example, Miller (1981) argued persuasively that the presence of multiple
jurisdictions in the Los Angeles area is fiscally disadvantageous to poor com-
munities. Other studies cited the continuing central-city fiscal problems
resulting from the separation of needs from resources (Rusk 1995, 47). Ladd
and Yinger (1989, 113-14) found that between 1972 and 1982, expenditure
needs of large cities grew faster than their revenue-raising capacities. Thus
the fiscal health of the average central city declined significantly during this
period.2
In sum, ample evidence over an extended period reveals that many central
cities suffer significant disadvantages compared to their surrounding areas.
But to what extent are these disparities the result of metropolitan governmen-
tal fragmentation? Implicitly, and at times directly, many observers saw the
proliferation of local jurisdictions and the salience of political boundaries as
contributing to these disparities. The results of empirical research are mixed,
however.
Hill (1974) was one of the first to blame political fragmentation for creat-
ing and perpetuating inequality among MSA residents. His dependent vari-
able was income inequality among municipalities above a population of
2,500 within a standard MSA (N = 63; 1960 data). He used two measures of
governmental fragmentation—total number of cities and number per capita
in the MSA. Only the second indicator (per capita) was statistically signifi-
cant for the inequality measure. Within a short time, two critics attacked
Hill’s work. The nature of his dependent variable was of particular concern.
Neiman (1976) claimed that family income differences among cities is
“irreparably deficient” as a way of assessing unequal municipal capacity to
support public services. Ostrom (1983) also objected to Hill’s methodology.
She contended that the number of governments as a measure of fragmenta-
tion is flawed. Such an indicator, she wrote, is “sensitive to the size of the
units for which measures of central tendency are being compared. . . .
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Comparing means or medians of different-sized units can lead to false con-
clusions about the extent of heterogeneity in a population” (p. 98).
Two other comparative studies dealing with the effects of the fractionated
metropolis on income inequality are noteworthy. Using information from 55
large MSAs, Logan and Schneider (1982) produced mixed evidence for the
effects of governmental organization. They measured inequality as a ratio of
median suburban household income to median family income of the central
city. Their main proxy for fragmentation—number of suburbs per 1,000 resi-
dents—did not reach statistical significance. However, they found that
central-city annexation was significant for 1970 but not for 1960. They also
noted a strong tendency toward greater inequality in metropolitan areas
where suburbs rely more heavily on the property tax. Percentage nonwhite
(in the North only) also was a predictor of interjurisdictional inequality.
Using 1980 data, Bollens (1986) conducted a similar investigation.
Employing a central-city/suburban income disparity dependent variable, he
reported significant effects for suburban property tax reliance, annexation
history, percentage black (MSA), and central-city age. Bollen’s measure of
fragmentation—number of noncentral cities (NCC) (more than 10,000) per
100,000 NCC residents—was not significant.
Previously, we mentioned Weiher’s (1991) research showing that frag-
mentation increases racial disparities between the suburb and the central city.
Rusk (1995, 27-30) also offered evidence that “inelastic” metropolitan areas
are more racially segregated than “elastic” ones. Inelastic areas have central
cities completely surrounded by suburbs; in elastic areas, the core city can
expand and capture new outward growth. Although numerous studies have
analyzed metropolitan racial disparities (e.g., Massey and Denton 1988;
Taeuber and Taeuber 1964), few have actually included political structure as
an explanatory variable.
Fiscal disparities among metropolitan communities are rampant. Still, the
question of causation endures. Over the years, scholars have debated whether
outlying areas exploit the center. The suburban and commuting population in
particular may force the inner city to spend more for public services than it
otherwise would (Davies 1965; Kasarda 1972). On the other hand, when cen-
tral cities can remain economically robust, they may attract commerce from
the periphery that brings them additional tax revenue. More to the point, is
there evidence that greater fragmentation contributes to higher costs or
greater fiscal burdens for central cities? The findings are inconclusive. Sjo-
quist (1982) was one of the first to discover a negative relationship between
the number of municipal governments and municipal spending levels. Using
a different methodology, Palumbo (1983) reached the opposite conclusion;
more metropolitan governments lead to higher central-city spending. A
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similar dispute with contradictory results appeared a few years later (see
Boyne 1992; Dolan 1990).
A related issue involves the broader relationship between the central city
and the suburb. To what extent are they interdependent, and, in particular, is a
healthy central city crucial to the overall vitality of a metropolitan area?
Savitch et al. (1993) found that the core and periphery were indeed highly
interdependent. In particular, flourishing central cities contributed signifi-
cantly to more prosperous suburbs. Others have disagreed (for a review of
this issue, see Ihlanfeldt 1995; Swanstrom 1996). In fact, Hill, Wolman, and
Ford (1995) argued that the causal connection runs in the other direction.
Metropolitan-wide growth should lead to narrower spatial disparities. Yet
when Hill and Wolman (1997) tested that hypothesis, they came to an oppo-
site conclusion: Robust metropolitan economies actually exacerbated the
income gap between the central city and the suburb. Even in tight labor mar-
kets, they concluded that inner-city workforces do not possess enough skills
to overcome the advantages suburban labor offers employers.3 These varying
interpretations, although not directly attributing causality to governmental
fragmentation, nonetheless highlight the continued salience of political
boundaries.
In all, many disputes over the effects of metropolitan government struc-
ture remain unresolved. The research to follow sheds additional light on
some of these issues. In particular, we will test three hypotheses. Greater
fragmentation and lower levels of central-city annexation contribute to (1) a
gap in personal income between the central city and the suburb, (2) the fiscal
hardship of the core city, and (3) racial separation and isolation within the
metropolitan area.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This study relies primarily on an urban poverty database created under the
direction of Kasarda (1993). It includes data for the 100 largest metropolitan
central cities (1980 population). With exceptions noted later, the data come
from standard census sources.4
The analysis includes three dependent variables. The most common mea-
sure to represent central-city/suburban disparity is the income difference
between the two areas. For individual families at least, income may be an
even more critical determinant of location than race. Absent the necessary
financial means, a family of whatever color or race may be precluded from
living in prosperous jurisdictions. Thus low-income families remain largely
confined to central cities where housing is more affordable (Downs 1994,
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47). And well-off communities, through zoning restrictions and building
codes, generally do not welcome residents who may be tax users rather than
taxpayers. So the first dependent variable is income disparity, a simple ratio
of per capita income for the area outside the central city (incorporated or not
but within the MSA) to the per capita income for the central city (for 1987; N =
97; M = 1.1; SD = .2).
The second variable is the fiscal health of the core community. Data are
not readily available to compare the fiscal well-being of the central city and
its surrounding area. Our argument does not depend on such a comparison in
any event. The concern is directly with the fiscal fitness of the center city.
Again, the basic objective is to assess whether political boundaries as mani-
fested through metropolitan fragmentation may adversely affect central-city
fiscal health. For this purpose, we rely on a standardized fiscal health mea-
sure for the central city created by Ladd and Yinger (1989, chap. 5). In gen-
eral terms, it represents the relationship between a city’s service needs and its
revenue-raising capacity. In the authors’words, “A fiscal health index of +20
percent, for example, indicates that a city could provide public services of
average quality at the selected tax burden and still have 20 percent of its
capacity left over for tax cuts or high-quality services” (Ladd and Yinger
1989, 8). The indicator is for 1986 (N = 56) and ranges from –96 (Newark,
New Jersey) to +45 (Greensboro, North Carolina) with a mean of –9.7 (SD =
30.2).
The third dependent variable attempts to capture racial differences in the
metropolis. As discussed in the previous section, reams have been written
over the years about the “chocolate” city and the “vanilla” suburbs (see espe-
cially Massey and Denton 1993). American apartheid is Massey and Den-
ton’s phrase to describe the amazing persistence of racial segregation in and
across U.S. cities. Weiher (1991) and Burns (1994) both have carefully docu-
mented the critical part that municipal boundaries play in this lamentable
American dilemma.
The urban poverty data set allows us to test several measures of racial
separation within the 100 metropolitan areas. Similar and good results were
obtained for two of the most commonly used measures—the index of dis-
similarity and an index of black isolation (see Massey and Hajnal 1995). The
index of dissimilarity (D) ranges from 0 to 100 and represents the proportion
of the population that must move to achieve spatial integration (for a thor-
ough discussion, see Weiher 1991, 125-30). A large value of D indicates a
high degree of racial separatism. The racial isolation (or exposure) indicator
assesses the propensity of blacks to inhabit geographic units populated
mainly by other blacks. It also varies between 0 and 100 and shows the prob-
ability of intraracial interaction within geographic units. Massey and Hajnal
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(1995, 535) demonstrate that when measured at the census tract level, the two
indicators show very similar levels of racial segregation. We elected to use
the measure of racial isolation primarily because our interest is in the effect of
boundaries or geographic units rather than the more general separation of the
races. For racial isolation, the range is from 9.7 to 83.7 (M = 56.9; SD = 16.6;
N = 76).5
We include three measures of metropolitan political fragmentation. The
first is the number of municipalities of more than 10,000 population per
1,000,000 residents of the MSA (for 1982)—cities per MSA (M = 11.4; SD =
19.2).6 Some version of this measure is perhaps the most commonly used
proxy for fragmentation. It assumes, following Weiher (1991), that more
political units afford greater opportunities for separation and escape, thus
contributing to central-city problems. Cities with a population of 10,000 or
more should be an especially useful way of representing decentralization.
Special districts even with taxing power are largely invisible (see Burns 1994,
117). School boundaries also may be indistinct to ordinary citizens. But com-
munities of more than 10,000 residents are visible enough to prove poten-
tially attractive to mobile urban dwellers.7
The second fragmentation measure is the population of the central city as a
proportion of the MSA population. Several observers have identified such a
measure as an important indicator of central-city well-being. In the words of
Savitch et al. (1993), “the degree of [central-city] inclusion is a reasonably
sound predictor of how well a city does relative to its suburbs.” We call this
variable central-city population share (M = .39; SD = .20). A third proxy for
fragmentation is a change measure designed to reflect the core city’s success
in expanding its borders. Rusk (1995) considers central-city elasticity, its
capacity to capture new growth and development, as the key to its survival.8
The measure is created as the proportion of change in the central-city area
(square miles) between 1970 and 1990. We call it central-city area growth (M =
1.43; SD = 1.23) (U.S. Bureau of Census 1972, 1994).
These three fragmentation measures are the sort traditionally used in
research such as this. They represent governments, population, and land area.
Perhaps we should consider a functional measure of fragmentation as well.
To what extent are metropolitan areas functionally integrated through coop-
erative arrangements and intergovernmental agreements? For years, certain
scholars have argued that viewing the metropolis as a marketplace can high-
light both the cooperative and competitive nature of interjurisdictional rela-
tionships (Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren 1961; Warren 1964; for a broader
view of this perspective, see Schneider 1989; Stein 1990). Yet measures of
intergovernmental cooperation for a large group of cities are difficult to
obtain. The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR),
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however, did collect data on such agreements in 1988 for 667 U.S. cities.
Unfortunately, the match was poor between that group and our large central
cities. Using such a measure of intergovernmental relations based on the
ACIR data would greatly reduce the cases for the subsequent analysis.9 Thus
we reluctantly decided against its inclusion.
The remaining independent variables are basically control measures iden-
tical or similar to those used in previous research on central-city/suburban
inequality. In most cases, these measures are for the central city rather than
for the MSA as a whole. The assumption is that many of these variables repre-
sent forces that may “push” people and jobs outward, thus placing the central
city at a disadvantage to its surrounding area.
1. Metropolitan population, 1990. We should control for population size of the
MSA in the subsequent analysis. It may serve as a proxy for other unmeasured
influences, although in general we would expect central cities in large MSAs to
be disadvantaged compared to their suburbs.
2. Metropolitan income, 1990 (per capita). We need to be sure that any variations
in income disparities and fiscal health in particular are not the result of differ-
ences in metropolitan income levels.
3. Central-city employment rate, 1990 (100 – unemployment rate). Despite the
controversy over the economic interdependency of the central city and suburb,
we will opt for the conventional wisdom and assume that tight labor markets in
the core will reduce metropolitan spatial disparities.10
4. Percentage black, 1990 (central city). The assumption is that large proportions
of the black population in the core city will be associated with differentials fa-
voring the outlying area. It should also be especially useful in predicting MSA
black isolation.
5. Age of city (the number of years since the central city reached a population of
50,000). Older cities are less likely to have captured areas of new growth and
thus should suffer in comparison to their outlying area (source: various cen-
suses of populations).
6. Region (North Central, South, West). We include region as a control for the ten-
dency of southern and western MSAs to have fewer differences between the
core and periphery (Northeast is the omitted category).
The interval in the years between most of the explanatory measures and
the dependent variables requires comment. Most problematic is the use of a
1980 racial separation index. Our primary defense is the relatively slow rate
of change for these measures over time. For example, at the county level,
Massey and Hajnal (1995, 535) reported that indices of black-white separa-
tion varied hardly at all between 1970 and 1990, declining from .48 to .46.
The authors did note, however, that black-white differentials at the municipal
level increased somewhat, from .35 to .49. If anything, the use of 1980 mea-
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sures may understate the actual level of racial segregation among these cities.
Racial separation data for MSAs are not available for 1990.
Big-city fiscal health apparently is less stable over time than racial differ-
ences. For the late 1980s, Ladd and Yinger (1989, 316-19) found a slight
improvement in the standardized fiscal health for their 56 cities. The authors
commented that the economic expansion of that period, however, did nothing
to reduce the enormous diversity in fiscal health across cities. Overall, their
1972 fiscal health measure correlated at .83 with the 1986 measure for the 56
central cities included in this analysis.
RESULTS
Our principal interest is in how the metropolitan fragmentation measures
behave in the three regression equations. First, consider the income disparity
dependent variable (column 1 in Table 1). None of the governmental organi-
zation variables reaches statistical significance. Three of the control mea-
sures do, however—metro income (t = 5.14), central-city employment rate
(t = –5.13), and age of city (t = 2.49). A tight central-city labor market should
contribute to a narrower income gap between the center and its perimeter. We
cannot infer causation here, but the results are consistent with the position of
Savitch et al. (1993) rather than Hill and Wolman (1997). Specifically, a one
percentage point increase in core employment leads to a decline in a subur-
ban/central-city income disparity of .04. Income has the opposite effect.
MSAs with higher per capita incomes have wider spatial income inequalities.
To be sure, wealthy metro areas often coexist with poor inner cities. The evi-
dence here, though, does not prove that as MSA income grows, its central city
will become poorer. But this relationship does suggest that as incomes rise in
the entire area, the central city will not necessarily benefit. Finally, as
expected, older central cities have wider disparities between the core and
periphery. The adjusted R2 for this equation is .61.11
Next we consider the central-city fiscal health dependent variable. Here,
one of the measures of fragmentation is statistically significant—central-city
population share of the MSA. Surprisingly, it exhibits an unexpected sign.
The larger the central city’s population share of the metropolitan total, the
worse its fiscal well-being (t = –2.43).12 We had assumed that with more
options for escape, the core area would lose its tax base and suffer adverse fis-
cal consequences. These results suggest a rethinking of this conventional
wisdom. The more dominant the central city, apparently, the more fiscally at
risk it becomes.13 This unexpected finding requires a bit of explanation.
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Perhaps where central cities represent a substantial proportion of the
area’s population, the inner city encounters less pressure for fiscal restraint.
This perspective comports with Zax’s (1989) findings regarding metropoli-
tan fragmentation. Based on his research among all U.S. counties, he argued
that decentralization does generate competitive forces that may promote effi-
cient provision of public services and a smaller local public sector (also see
Eberts and Gornberg 1989). It seems likely as well that a dominant central
city may be a more prominent magnet for the disadvantaged of the region.
588 URBAN AFFAIRS REVIEW / March 1999
TABLE 1: Determinants of Metropolitan Income Disparity, Central-City Fiscal
Health, and MSA Racial Isolation
Income Central-City MSA
Disparitya Fiscal Health Black Isolation
Independent Variables (N = 97) (N = 56) (N = 76)
Metropolitan fragmentation
Cities per MSA/100,000 .00 –1.31 2.01
(.55) (–1.07) (3.82)**
Central-city population share –.02 –40.42 3.67
(–.25) (–2.43)* (.61)
Central-city area growth, 1970-1990 –.00 .37 –1.00
(–.16) (.04) (–1.32)
Control measures
Metro population 7.43 · 10 –10 –3.82 · 10–6 2.15 · 10 –6
(.07) (–2.17)* (3.04)**
Metro income, per capita 5.54 · 10 –5 .01 .00
(5.14)** (2.71)* (1.47)
Central-city employment rate –.04 4.77 .13
(–5.13)** (2.99)** (.27)
Black % (central city) –1.50 · 10 –4 –.22 .50
(–.12) (–.71) (5.58)**
Age of city .01 –1.58 .01
(2.49)* (–1.35) (.02)
North Central .04 3.26 8.78
(.74) (.34) (2.60)*
South –.02 6.87 8.29
(–.27) (.54) (2.08)*
West .01 –5.01 –11.62
(.16) (–.47) (–2.76)**
Adjusted R2 .61 .59 .75
F 14.87** 8.33** 21.68**
NOTE: Coefficients are unstandardized regression slopes with t-values in parentheses. MSA =
metropolitan statistical area.
a. Income disparity is suburban/central city (%).
* Significant at < .05. ** Significant at < .01.
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Thus the core community becomes saddled with the extra burden of costly
social services, which, of course, create intense fiscal pressures. Another
related and not incompatible possibility is that a vibrant group of perimeter
cities contributes to the financial well-being of the core. The central city
remains a vital part of the metropolis, of course, but its fiscal fate may depend
increasingly on the economic vitality of its surrounding area. Thus, consis-
tent with the competitive theory, a larger number of sizable suburbs may be
critical to a robust regional economy.
Three of the control measures for the second dependent variable (fiscal
health) are statistically significant—central-city employment rate (t = 2.99),
metro income (t = 2.71), and metropolitan population for 1990 (t = –2.17). In
this case, where the core jurisdiction has high employment levels and the
MSA has higher per capita income, the central city should experience less
financial stress. However, central cities with large populations tend to have
less robust fiscal health. We might note briefly that in the bivariate case, cen-
tral cities with higher proportions of African-Americans are more likely to be
fiscally stressed (r = –.39), but that effect disappears under controlled condi-
tions. The adjusted level of explained variance for this equation is .59.
Finally, we come to column three in Table 1—the separation of black and
white in the metropolis. Does fragmentation matter here? Indeed it does. One
measure of fragmentation is a strong predictor of racial segregation in the
MSA—the number of cities of 10,000 or more in the area (t = 3.82). A
metropolis that includes a larger number of modest-sized or larger suburbs
(per MSA population) should also manifest higher levels of black-white
separation within the area. For every increase of one suburb (per 1,000,000
people), black racial isolation, on average, should rise by 2.01 units. Frag-
mentation in this form, at least, has obvious adverse consequences for white-
black contact. Presumably, the presence of visible alternate locales encour-
ages white flight. This effect ensues, of course, even when other metropolitan
influences are taken into account. Several other control measures are statisti-
cally significant—percentage central-city population that is black, total
MSA population, and all the regional variables. Highly populated metro
areas tend to manifest greater racial separation than their smaller counter-
parts (t = 3.04). In addition, African-Americans are more isolated in north-
central and southern MSAs than in other regions; the western metropolis is
less racially segregated. We had expected the proportion of African-
Americans in the core to be a powerful predictor of racial segregation.
Indeed, that measure was the strongest of all independent variables for the
final model (t = 5.58). Other things equal, the proportion of African-
Americans in the core city still contributes significantly to black isolation
within the MSA. The adjusted R2 here is .75.
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IS METROPOLITAN STRUCTURE
BENIGN OR HARMFUL?
For decades, reformers have lamented the adverse consequences of the
multinucleated metropolis. Perhaps the most persuasive criticism has been
the way suburban growth separates urban needs from resources. No doubt,
the central city bears a disproportionate share of the nation’s urban problems,
and the suburbs generally escape responsibility for dealing with the burdens
of the inner city’s downtrodden and dispossessed. In Broder’s (1996) words,
“The racial and economic gap between cities and suburbs is probably the big-
gest challenge to the long-term health of this society.” Even so, there is little
agreement about whether the political fragmentation of the metropolis con-
tributes independently to this unfortunate situation.
This research offers a further test of the proposition that metropolitan gov-
ernmental structure has social, economic, and racial consequences. Follow-
ing the reform logic, we assumed that the proliferation of local governments
and the boundary constraints imposed on the central city would have at least
three adverse effects. Fragmentation should contribute to greater income dis-
parities between the central city and the suburb. It should worsen the core
city’s fiscal health and aggravate the racial divisions within large urban areas.
These hypotheses seemed defensible even though a growing body of research
has questioned the traditional reformist perspective. Public choice theory, for
example, supports the position that multiple jurisdictions create a market-like
environment within the metropolis. Such competition presumably compels
local governments to operate more efficiently and to be more responsive to
citizen-consumers.
The preceding analysis found only modest effects for metropolitan struc-
ture. We tested three measures of fragmentation, only two of which were of
any consequence for separate dependent variables. Central-city population
share was a useful predictor for central-city fiscal health, but the direction of
that relationship was unexpected. When it comes to financial vigor, core cit-
ies apparently benefit when they are a smaller part of the metropolitan whole.
One explanation relies on the effect of competition; pressures from surround-
ing communities keep central-city spending in check. Another interpretation
emphasizes the nature of market forces operating within the metropolis. As
Peterson (1981, 22) observes, cities seek to improve their market posi-
tion—to make themselves more attractive to economic activity. And central
cities? They, of course, are the “heart and node” of the MSA (Blair 1995, 17).
If these core communities can remain sufficiently attractive to the hinterland,
they may capture significant economic activity from affluent nonresidents
and enjoy the multiplier effects of that commerce. This means more tax
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revenue and less financial strain. Perhaps core cities that are a smaller frac-
tion of the area possess more appealing attributes and thus are especially suc-
cessful in remaining vital commercial and financial centers.14 On the negative
side, we discovered that MSAs with more suburbs of 10,000 and above (per
1,000,000 residents) had higher levels of black isolation. Although our mea-
sure of segregation is areawide, it seems reasonable to assume that whites
wanting to minimize interracial contact would seek non-central-city loca-
tions. Apparently, the presence of visible alternative communities makes that
option easier to pursue.
So how much does metropolitan fragmentation matter? No doubt, Rusk
(1995) and Broder (1996) are correct. The isolation of the inner city from the
growing, white, wealthier suburbs constitutes the new shame of the cities if
not the entire country. But can we blame governmental structure? Apparently
not when it comes to the fiscal health of the area and even its central city. To
the extent fragmentation creates a competitive environment, multiple juris-
dictions do no harm at the least. Racially, the story is more complex. Frag-
mentation does appear to facilitate efforts by white urban dwellers to mini-
mize contact with black residents. It would be overly simple, of course, to
assume that a reduction in the proliferation of perimeter jurisdictions would
substantially reduce racial segregation in U.S. metropolitan areas. That mas-
sive problem is far too intractable. The relationship between fragmentation
and black isolation does remind us, though, that municipal boundaries are not
inconsequential. They have abundant social meaning.
NOTES
1. The polycentric metropolis has its defenders, of course. According to public choice
scholars, building on the theoretical insights of Tiebout (1956), the presence of numerous locali-
ties within the metropolitan area is beneficial. Such an arrangement gives urbanites the opportu-
nity to select those jurisdictions that best match their tax/policy preferences (see Schneider 1985;
Stein 1987; Warren 1964). Presumably, the competitive forces emanating from this quasi-
market system compel local governments to become more efficient service providers and to be
more responsive to citizen tax and spending preferences (Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren 1961).
2. Bahl, Martinez-Vazquez, and Sjoquist (1992), however, identified only a slight increase
in central-city/suburban fiscal inequalities between 1957 and 1987.
3. Hill and Wolman (1997) did find that if the metro labor market is very tight, then spatial
disparity narrows.
4. We made several coding decisions when working from U.S. Bureau of the Census
(1991) data. First, the population and income data are for the primary metropolitan statistical
area (MSA), not the consolidated MSA. For example, data for San Francisco do not include Oak-
land; Dallas excludes Ft. Worth. However, we could not separate Long Beach from Los Angeles.
Second, we made a further decision about what to include in the suburban ring. If the outlying
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area included a city of 250,000 or more, we eliminated that city on the grounds that it probably
would not be considered a “suburb” in common usage. Similarly, if the outlying area contained a
city that represented 50% or more of the central-city population, it was dropped. So the Kansas
City, Missouri, outlying area excludes Kansas City, Kansas; Miami omits Hialeah; and Greens-
boro excludes Winston-Salem. For a few measures (e.g., per capita income), the data do not per-
mit us to separate the central city from a large neighbor in the same primary MSA. For example,
the outside central-city income data, used in calculating income disparity, are the same for Min-
neapolis and St. Paul. The same is true for Norfolk and Virginia Beach.
5. The data for MSA black isolation came originally from Wilger (1989). The formula is as
follows: bPb = {S [Bi (bi/ti)]} · 100, where P = proportion of all blacks in the total MSA, (B/T); B =
black population of the metropolitan area; Bi = proportion of all blacks in tract i, (bi/B); bi = black
population in tract i; and ti = total population in tract i. One measure of fragmentation—cities (>
10,000) per MSA—is statistically significant at the .01 level for equations using both D and
black isolation (the two measures of segregation correlate at .74). The adjusted R2 for the racial
dissimilarity equation is .64, with an F of 10.66; explained variance for the racial isolation equa-
tion is .75 (F = 21.68).
We also tried several measures more directly designed to compare racial separation between
the central city and the suburb. The first reflects the percentage of the black MSA population liv-
ing in the central city. In this case, the cities per MSA measure was not significant. However,
another fragmentation measure was—the percentage of the metropolitan population residing in
the central city. Where the central city is a larger part of the metropolitan population, a higher
percentage of blacks are likely to inhabit the core city. This relationship between fragmentation
and the racial variable may partly be artifactual, however. Where the central city contains a high
proportion of the total area population, one would expect it also to contain a higher share of the
African-American population. Several other core city/suburb racial variables were less useful.
We tried the ratio of blacks to whites in the central city divided by a similar ratio for the suburbs.
The R2 dropped precipitously, and only one variable was statistically significant—percentage
black in the core. In all, we think the results to follow indicate that the better measure of racial
separation is black isolation for the metropolitan area.
6. The source for this measure is the Census of Governments (U.S. Bureau of the Census
1982, 1992). Unfortunately, more recent versions of this source no longer report the number of
local governments within metropolitan areas.
7. In the equations to follow, we actually tested three related versions of urban fragmenta-
tion: (1) all local units with taxing powers, (2) cities of 10,000 or more population, and (3) cities
of 10,000 and above plus all school districts. We were surprised at the continued existence of
multiple school districts in many large urban areas. For example, Chicago has more than 300,
and Boston has almost 150. Perhaps the abundance of so many relatively small districts dimin-
ished the value of the combined city-school district fragmentation variable. Zax’s (1989)
research on counties also showed that general-purpose local governments are the key to
increased metropolitan competition rather than single-purpose governments such as special dis-
tricts or school districts.
8. The measure we use is similar to Rusk’s (1995) elasticity index, which comprises den-
sity and the degree to which the central city expanded its limits between 1950 and 1990.
9. Robert Stein was good enough to furnish the 1988 data for two measures—the number
of intergovernmental agreements and the percentage of total agreements for each city. Including
either of these two measures in the analysis reduces the N to 23, 28, and 36.
Our preliminary analysis also included a political fragmentation index (for 1980) developed
by Lewis (1996, 49), but it also reduced our N substantially and was not statistically significant in
any of the three subsequent equations.
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10. We also tried a metropolitan employment measure (operationalized as 100 – unemploy-
ment rate) in place of central-city employment. The variables are closely related (r = .53), but the
metro rate was not a significant predictor in any of the equations. We should note that our mea-
sure of employment differed from Hill and Wolman’s (1997).
11. The equations in Table 1 manifest little multicollinearity. Only one simple relationship
among independent variables is above .50; employment rate and percentage black are correlated
at –.60. Also, following Studenmund (1997, 274-76), we checked the variance inflation factor
(VIF) for each independent variable. He contends that if the VIF is above 5.0, then multicolline-
arity may be problematic. The VIF for one variable is above that level—southern region (VIF =
5.27). Percentage black is close to 5.0 (4.89). We ran additional equations, dropping each of
these two measures sequentially. Few changes of any consequence occurred, so we believe the
results overall are quite robust.
12. Here we might note that a city’s fiscal well-being is related to the disparities in central-
city/suburban income. The greater the disparity, the poorer the central city’s fiscal health (r =
–.47). Black-white racial differentiation is not prominently correlated with either of the other
two dependent variables—.31 with income disparity and –.22 with fiscal health.
13. One reviewer suggested that the relationship between the central city’s population share
and its fiscal well-being might be curvilinear. Presumably, if the city reaches almost total domi-
nance, it might be less fiscally at risk. The plot of the simple relationship between these two
measures does not suggest any nonlinearity. Still, we added a squared term (central-city popula-
tion share squared) to equation 2 in Table 1. Its presence did not increase explained variance, and
neither it nor the base term was statistically significant.
14. The correlation between the central cities’percentage of the MSA and per capita income
is –.41; where the core is smaller relative to its periphery, MSA income tends to be higher.
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